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 Trial TacTics
The problems associated with eyewitness identification are well known. Examination of cases in which defendants who had been 
convicted but were later exonerated shows that mis-
taken eyewitness identification is one of the major 
contributors to wrongful convictions. Courts strug-
gle with what to do about eyewitness identifications 
because prosecutions often cannot proceed without 
witnesses testifying to what they believe they saw and 
who they believe committed criminal acts. Should 
they instruct jurors on the dangers of mistaken eye-
witness identification? Should they admit expert 
testimony on the dangers of  mistaken eyewitness 
testimony? Should they rely exclusively on cross-
examination to challenge the reliability of  expert 
testimony? There is not yet a consensus on the best 
approach, although there are positive developments 
in certain police departments and prosecutor offices 
with respect to how photo arrays should be shown 
to witnesses. The issue does not go away, as illus-
trated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (holding that 
due process does not require exclusion of suggestive 
identifications where there is no law enforcement 
responsibility for the suggestiveness).
An issue that is closely related to eyewitness testimony 
is voice identification, which might be called “earwit-
ness identification.” Should courts trust that jurors will 
be able to evaluate the reliability of such identification 
without some assistance from the judge or from expert 
witnesses? That is a question that arose in United States 
v. Schiro, 679 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2012).
The Schiro Facts
Five defendants were charged with a racketeering 
(RICO) conspiracy as a result of their involvement 
in the “Chicago Outfit,” which the court described 
as a “long-running lineal descendant of Al Capone’s 
gang.” (Id. at 524.) The Outfit conducted its opera-
tions through a series of “street crews.” Two of the 
five defendants had been charged with and convicted 
of RICO conspiracy arising from their involvement 
with street crews. They argued unsuccessfully that 
they were placed in double jeopardy when they were 
charged with a RICO conspiracy for involvement in 
the Outfit given that the criminal activities of the Out-
fit and the crews were one and the same. The court 
concluded that while the street crews were operating 
divisions of the Outfit, the Outfit had powers and 
responsibilities that the crews did not have.
James Marcello, one of  the defendants who 
lost his double jeopardy claim, raised an objection 
at trial and argued on appeal that the trial judge 
abused discretion in excluding expert testimony 
on the issue of voice identification. The majority 
described the evidence issue as follows:
Marcello raises an evidentiary issue. A victim’s 
daughter identified Marcello’s voice as that of 
the man who called her father on the day of 
the father’s disappearance. Marcello wanted 
to present an expert witness who would testify 
that voice identifications are often mistaken. 
The judge excluded the evidence. He was skep-
tical about its empirical basis and also thought 
that the jury already had a good understanding 
of the fallibility of “earwitness” identification. 
We do not suggest that such expert evidence is 
worthless or that jurors always grasp the risk 
of misidentification inherent in eyewitness and 
earwitness testimony. But a trial judge has a 
responsibility to screen expert evidence for 
reliability and to determine the total effects of 
proposed evidence, weighing its probative value 
against its potential to (among other things) 
confuse the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Both 
reliability and potential for confusion were fac-
tors in this case and we cannot say the judge 
abused his discretion in refusing to admit the 
expert evidence, which the jury might have 
taken as a signal that it should disregard the 
witness’s identification testimony. See United 
States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 
2009). If jurors are told merely that voice identi-
fications frequently are mistaken, what are they 
to do with this information? The defendant’s 
lawyer will argue mistaken identification and 
jurors told that such mistakes are common may 
be afraid to make their own judgment.
(Schiro, 679 F.3d at 529.)
A dissenting judge disagreed with the majority on 
the double jeopardy issue and had a very different 
take on the voice identification issue. She argued that 
Marcello’s proposed expert testimony would have 
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done much more than simply tell the jury that voice 
identifications are often mistaken, and she described 
the background and the importance of  the voice 
identification in more detail than did the majority.
Marcello was accused of murdering Michael 
Spilotro. Spilotro’s daughter, Michelle, testi-
fied that on the day of her father’s murder, a 
man called their home and asked to speak to 
him. She testified that the same person had 
regularly called her father. Three years after 
Spilotro’s death, Michelle listened to a “voice 
lineup” put together by the FBI. The first 
five voices on the tape were those of officers 
reading a sample piece of  text; the last was 
Marcello’s. Michelle picked Marcello’s voice 
as the one she remembered hearing on the day 
of her father’s death. At trial, she told the jury 
that she was “100 percent sure” it was Marcel-
lo’s voice she had heard on the phone.
(Id. at 542 (Wood, J., dissenting).)
The Expert Testimony
Marcello sought to rely on Daniel Yarmey, a pro-
fessor of psychology who had conducted extensive 
research on memory and who had paid particu-
lar attention to voice identification. The proposed 
expert testimony had two parts: it would have 
explained the reliability problems with voice iden-
tification, and it would have addressed specific issues 
relating to the FBI voice lineup.
Yarmey did not simply offer an opinion that voice 
identifications were often unreliable; he intended to 
point to specific studies in which misidentification 
rates were as high as 45 percent, and he was pre-
pared to discuss the factors that affect the reliability 
of voice lineups. In addition, Yarmey was prepared to 
describe an empirical analysis of the FBI voice lineup 
that he conducted. In his experiment, he recruited 
157 undergraduates at his university to listen to the 
lineup and to try to identify the suspect’s voice using 
a number of factors. The students identified Marcello 
at a rate that exceeded pure chance. This suggested 
that the “samples” used by the FBI were not a neu-
tral or reliable test of the daughter’s ability to identify 
Marcello’s voice, because students were identifying it 
more often than chance would predict even though 
they had no experience with the voice.
The trial judge excluded the proposed testimony, 
but not because of a concern about Yarmey’s quali-
fications or the reliability of his testimony. Instead, 
the judge concluded that it was not necessary to assist 
the jury because the judge examined the voice lineup 
and found that there was “nothing about the differ-
ence [between Marcello’s voice and the others] that 
would suggest to a hearer, to a listener, that one or the 
other was actually the suspect.” (Id. at 543 (alteration 
in original).) Apparently, the judge thought the jury 
could make the same analysis without expert help.
The Dissent’s concern
The dissent was concerned about eyewitness testi-
mony generally and the mounting evidence of its 
contribution toward erroneous convictions:
Even though our review of a district court’s 
decision not to admit expert testimony is def-
erential, see United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 
942, 950 (7th Cir. 2005), in my view the district 
court’s refusal to admit Dr. Yarmey’s testi-
mony was a mistake. In recent years, courts 
have become more aware of  the reality that 
human memory is not necessarily reliable. A 
study of 200 wrongful convictions revealed 
that 79% rested in part on mistaken eyewitness 
identifications. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 Colum. l. Rev. 55, 60 (2008). 
This does not mean that courts must impose 
a blanket ban on such testimony, but it is criti-
cal to be cautious. We cannot ignore the power 
that a witness’s claim to be “100% sure” may 
have on a jury, nor can we ignore that such wit-
nesses are sometimes, unfortunately, mistaken. 
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that 
one tool that courts can use to ensure juries 
do not give such testimony more weight than 
it is worth is to allow “expert testimony on the 
hazards of eyewitness identification.” Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 729, 181 L. 
Ed. 2d 694 (2012). As Dr. Yarmey’s research 
shows, a witness’s voice memory is not exempt 
from the sort of problems that we more com-
monly associate with a witness’s vision; just 
as with eyewitness identification, expert testi-
mony on the reliability of voice identification 
reveals vulnerabilities that lie outside the range 
of common knowledge.
(Schiro, 679 F.3d at 543.)
The dissent cited a prior decision in which the 
court suggested that trial judges should not exclude 
expert testimony simply because jurors may appre-
ciate that eyewitness testimony is fallible.
As we explained in United States v. Bartlett, 
expert testimony should not be kept out sim-
ply because a court believes “jurors know 
from their daily lives that memory is falli-
ble.” 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009). That 
may be true, but “[t]he question that social 
science can address is how fallible,” id., and 
thus how deeply the jury might wish to dis-
count any given identification. “That jurors 
have beliefs about this does not make expert 
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evidence irrelevant; to the contrary, it may 
make such evidence vital, for if  jurors’ beliefs 
are mistaken then they may reach incorrect 
conclusions. Expert evidence can help jurors 
evaluate whether their beliefs about the reli-
ability of eyewitness testimony are correct.” Id.
(Schiro, 679 F.3d at 543.)
Finally, the dissent pointed out that the trial judge’s 
opinion was inconsistent with the experiment that Dr. 
Yarmey conducted, which suggested that the judge 
might have been wrong and that jurors might simi-
larly fail to appreciate problems with the voice lineup.
As is clear from the district court’s remarks 
in this case, the court itself  held beliefs about 
the reliability and suggestiveness of the voice 
lineup that are belied by the expert’s conclu-
sions. As far as we know, the jurors shared 
these misconceptions. This case thus highlights 
why it is critical for jurors to hear expert testi-
mony in order to be able correctly to evaluate 
a witness’s memory. Just because courts have 
routinely admitted laywitness identification in 
the past is no reason to continue to do so with-
out skepticism, in light of  modern research 
showing the fallibility of such identifications. 
When a court does admit such identification 
testimony, expert testimony will often be nec-




Given the evidence that mistaken identification testi-
mony has contributed to wrongful convictions, there 
is good reason for courts to seek ways to reduce the 
likelihood that jurors will treat such testimony as 
infallible and focus on the factors that tend to increase 
or decrease reliability. One way is to admit expert 
testimony that can educate jurors on these factors.
There also is some reason to believe that jurors 
may be uncertain as to whether voice identification 
is more reliable, less reliable, or similar in reliability 
to visual identification. Each reader can ask himself  
or herself  this question: what do I know about the 
relative accuracy of ear and eye identifications? If  
the answer is “nothing,” that answer would suggest 
the usefulness of expert testimony when any form 
of identification evidence is proffered.
But, the case for admitting some expert testimony 
does not necessarily mean that all such testimony 
should be admitted. There is a good argument in 
favor of  testimony that does not purport to tell 
jurors how reliable particular testimony is and that 
focuses on factors that should usually be considered 
in assessing eyewitness accounts.
One part of Yarmey’s testimony fits this descrip-
tion. But what about the experiment? The dissenting 
judge appeared to argue that the fact that the judge 
reached a different conclusion about the reliability 
of the voice lineup demonstrated the need for the 
jury to hear about the experiment. This argument 
failed to address, however, seven crucial words that 
the dissent used to describe the experiment in which 
the students listened to the FBI voice lineup: the 
students were asked to “evaluate it using a number 
of  factors.” What were those factors? The choice 
of  factors identified for the students might have 
explained their more than random selection of Mar-
cello’s voice. Presumably, the daughter who made 
the identification was not given factors to consider. 
The question, then, is whether choice of factors can 
itself  influence an identification.
Moreover, the daughter testified that she had 
heard the same voice on a number of prior occa-
sions. Does the research indicate whether and to 
what extent repeated exposure to an individual or 
a voice may increase the ability to make an accurate 
identification? If  so, would it be important to bring 
this information to the jury? If  not, is there a dan-
ger that general testimony about identifications may 
fail to focus on an important factor?
These are questions that will be asked as iden-
tifications are challenged and expert testimony is 
offered. There should be no doubt that there is a 
place for expert testimony about identifications. 
Yarmey’s testimony may serve as a reminder that a 
trial judge need not decide that proffered testimony 
must be either admitted or excluded in its entirety. A 
judge may decide that some portions of testimony 
provide useful background for jurors to consider 
while other portions raise questions about reliability.
Looking back at Yarmey’s testimony, it seems clear 
that the majority may have exaggerated when it said 
that if  the judge had admitted the testimony, “the 
jury might have taken [this] as a signal that it should 
disregard the witness’s identification testimony.” (Id. 
at 529 (majority opinion).) In fact, had the testimony 
been admitted, the jurors might have understood that 
Yarmey was simply educating the jurors on the fact 
that sometimes witnesses are wrong and that some 
identifications are more suggestive than jurors might 
realize. The jurors would have still been aware that 
the daughter had heard the voice on previous occa-
sions. The answer to the majority’s question, which 
was “[i]f jurors are told merely that voice identifica-
tions frequently are mistaken, what are they to do 
with this information?” (id.), is that jurors should not 
simply be told that voice identifications frequently are 
mistaken; instead they should be educated as to fac-
tors that promote or detract from accuracy, and they 
should carefully examine identification testimony. 
That does not seem like a bad thing. n
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